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Agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa faces daunting challenges, which climate
change and increasing climate variability will compound in vulnerable areas. The impacts
of a changing climate on agricultural production in a world that warms by 4◦C or more
are likely to be severe in places. The livelihoods of many croppers and livestock keepers
in Africa are associated with diversity of options. The changes in crop and livestock
production that are likely to result in a 4◦C+ world will diminish the options available to
most smallholders. In such a world, current crop and livestock varieties and agricultural
practices will often be inadequate, and food security will be more difﬁcult to achieve
because of commodity price increases and local production shortfalls. While adaptation
strategies exist, considerable institutional and policy support will be needed to implement
them successfully on the scale required. Even in the 2◦C+ world that appears inevitable,
planning for and implementing successful adaptation strategies are critical if agricultural
growth in the region is to occur, food security be achieved and household livelihoods be
enhanced. As part of this effort, better understanding of the critical thresholds in global
and African food systems requires urgent research.
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1. Introduction
Agricultural and food systems globally face considerable challenges in the coming
decades. The demand for food continues to increase rapidly, as a result of various
drivers. Current estimates of human population in 2050 range from 7.96 billion to
10.46 billion; the medium variant estimate is 9.19 billion [1]. Continued population
growth could be a signiﬁcant impediment to achieving improvements in food
security in some countries, even as world population stabilizes sometime during
the present century. Food demand is also strongly affected by urbanization. More
people now live in urban settings than in rural areas. The next few decades will see
unprecedented urban growth particularly in Africa and Asia. Urbanization has
considerable impact on patterns of food consumption [2], but it is not necessarily
associated with a reduction in food insecurity. Recent data from southern Africa
indicate both chronic poverty and food insecurity in a survey of 11 cities [3].
A third key driver affecting food demand is income growth. Between 1950 and
2000, world per capita income grew at an annual rate of 2.1 per cent [4]. As
income grows, patterns of food expenditure change, often to more meats, fats
and sugar [5]. Projections of future economic growth vary considerably, but it
is expected to continue. Fourth, the agricultural production sector is catering
increasingly to globalized diets. Retailing through supermarkets is growing at 20
per cent per annum in some countries, and this growth is likely to continue over
the next few decades as urban consumers demand more processed foods, shifting
agricultural production systems from on-farm production towards agribusiness
chains [6].
Several projections suggest that global cereal and livestock production may
need to increase by between 60 and 100 per cent to 2050, depending on the
scenario, because of the increasing demand and changing patterns of demand
[7]. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this will require considerable investments
in agricultural research and technology and in infrastructural development [6].
Agricultural growth rates for SSA declined in the 2000s [8] and food insecurity is
still a concern, as the prevalence of malnourishment has only dropped from 34 to
30 per cent in two decades [9]. Agriculture is still an economic mainstay of many
SSA countries, employing about 60 per cent of the workforce and contributing an
average of 30 per cent of gross domestic product [10]. Although the efforts of the
agricultural research and development communities over the last 40 years have
led to successes in improving yields, increasing incomes and contributing to food
security, these successes have not been automatic and they have not occurred
everywhere [11]. Rural communities and households continue to demonstrate
tremendous adaptive capacity in the face of economic and social change, but
this capacity needs appropriate social, institutional and political support [12].
Even more challenging, the necessary increases in food production will have
to occur at the same time as the climate is changing and as climate variability
increases. Potential impacts of climate change on agricultural production in SSA
have been assessed in several modelling studies, using methods grounded in an
understanding of both crop and climate science (see the review by Challinor
et al. [13]). The inherent complexity of the climate–crop system, together with
fundamental limits to climate predictability, mean that predicted ranges for major
crops depend strongly on the methods and models used [14]. However, as in the
current climate, these broad trends are likely to mask local differences caused
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by spatial variability in climate. The regional distribution of hungry people will
change, with particularly large negative effects in SSA owing to the impact of
declines in crop yields on both food availability and access [15].
The challenges for agricultural development are already considerable, and there
is now general concern that climate change and increasing climate variability
will compound these in vulnerable areas. The interactions of climate with other
drivers of change in agricultural and food systems, and on broader development
trends, are only incompletely understood, but the impacts on human health and
nutrition and on water resources and other ecosystems goods and services may
be locally severe. In this paper, we outline how the impacts of a changing climate
in a world that warms by 4◦C or more will diminish the options available for
agricultural production and livelihoods in SSA. Many of the production trends
and food security goals that SSA still needs to achieve will be compromised, as
current crop and livestock varieties and agricultural practices will be inadequate.
Food security will become more difﬁcult to achieve as commodity prices increase
and local production shortfalls become the norm. Although adaptation strategies
for agricultural production and food security exist, and indeed rural communities
have been adapting to climatic variability for centuries, the institutional and
policy support needed to successfully implement such adaptation on the scale
that SSA requires in a 4◦C+ world would probably be very substantial [16].
We stress that planning for and implementing successful adaptation strategies
with local communities and households are key to maintaining options for food
security and agricultural growth in SSA, although exactly what constitutes a
successful adaptation option is a key research question. Many issues pertaining
to the role of livelihood diversiﬁcation out of or in to different forms of agriculture
need to be explored, and more attention needs to be given to empowering local
communities so that they have greater control over their adaptation choices and
livelihood pathways.
2. Impacts on agricultural production
(a) Projected changes in growing season length and crop and pasture yields
As noted above, several modelling studies have assessed the potential impacts of
climate change on agricultural production in SSA, although the projected ranges
of shifts in yields for the major crops vary widely [13,14]. Many of these studies
have estimated yield impacts in response to the Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios (SRES) greenhouse-gas emission scenarios [17]. The multi-model means
of surface warming (relative to 1980–1999) for the SRES scenarios A2, A1B
and B1 from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment show increases of about 1–2◦C to the 2050s and about 1.5–3◦C for
the 2080s [18].
Multiple model simulations are needed in order to sample the inherent
uncertainties in the projection of climate and agricultural production. Climate
models are computationally expensive to run, and so choices must be made
regarding the complexity, spatial resolution, simulation length and ensemble size
of the simulations [19]. An emphasis on complexity allows simulation of coupled
mechanisms such as the carbon cycle and feedbacks between agricultural land
management and climate. In addition to improving skill, greater spatial resolution
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increases relevance to regional planning. Greater ensemble size improves the
sampling of probabilities. Thus, assessments of a 4◦C+ world are contingent on
the choice of focus: studies that focus primarily on ensembles and uncertainty
may fail to demonstrate consensus, while other studies may ﬁnd a more clear
consensus emerging.
Here, to examine some of the likely effects on agricultural production in SSA
of warming of 4◦C or more, we carried out some downscaling and simulation runs
using climate projections from AR4 climate model runs assembled by New et al.
available at www.geog.ox.ac.uk/∼clivar/ClimateAtlas/4deg.html. We used an
ensemble mean of the three AR4 emissions scenarios (A2, A1B and B1) and the 14
general circulation models (GCMs) for which data were provided, and anomalies
were scaled to a global temperature increase of +5◦C. The climate differences
were downloaded at a resolution of 1◦ latitude–longitude. There are several ways
to increase the spatial resolution of climate model outputs, all of which have their
own strengths and weaknesses, recently reviewed by Wilby et al. [20]. Here, we
were also concerned to increase the temporal resolution of climate model outputs,
from monthly means of key variables to characteristic daily data that could then
be used to drive crop models. Accordingly, as in previous work, we used historical
gridded climate data from WorldClim [21], aggregated to 10 arc-minutes to speed
the analysis, which we took to be representative of current climatic conditions.
We produced a grid ﬁle for Africa of climate normals for future conditions at
10 arc-minutes by interpolation using inverse square distance weighting, one of
the methods that [20] refer to as ‘unintelligent downscaling’. To increase the
temporal resolution of the climate model outputs, we generated the daily data
needed (maximum and minimum temperature, rainfall and solar radiation) for
each grid cell using MARKSIM, a third-order Markov rainfall generator [22] that we
use as a GCM downscaler, as it uses elements of both stochastic downscaling and
weather typing on top of basic difference interpolation. MARKSIM generates daily
rainfall records using a third-order Markov process to predict the occurrence
of a rain day. It is able to simulate the observed variance of rainfall by way
of stochastic resampling of the relevant Markov process parameters. MARKSIM
is ﬁtted to a calibration dataset of over 10 000 weather stations worldwide,
clustered into some 700 climate clusters, using monthly values of precipitation
and maximum and minimum temperatures. All weather stations in the dataset
have at least 12 years of daily data, and a few have 100 years or more. Some of the
parameters of the MARKSIM model are calculated by regression from the cluster
most representative of the climate point to be simulated, whether that climate
is historical or projected into the future. More details of the methods used are
given in Jones et al. [23].
We carried out two sets of analyses. First, we estimated the average length of
growing period (LGP) for each pixel in SSA. LGP is an indicator of the adequacy
of conditions for crop growth, and is the period (or periods—some parts of SSA
have more than one well-deﬁned growing season per year) during the year when
both moisture availability and temperature are conducive to crop growth. LGP
was calculated on a daily basis using methods outlined in Jones [24], ignoring
intervening drought periods, and is thus a proxy for the number of grazing days,
but not necessarily of cropping success. Percentage changes in LGP between now
and the 2090s are shown in ﬁgure 1a, for areas with at least 40 days LGP under
current conditions. Much of the cropping and rangeland area of SSA is projected
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Figure 1. Length of growing period in the 2090s compared with the present. (a) Mean percentage
change for an ensemble of 14 GCMs. (b) Coefﬁcient of variation (%) of the change in length of
growing period for an ensemble of 14 GCMs. See text for details.
to undergo some loss in growing season length, and most of Africa in southern
latitudes may see losses of at least 20 per cent. Parts of East Africa may see
moderate increases in growing period, on the other hand.
There are several sources of uncertainty attached to such estimates, including
the uncertainties associated with the downscaling techniques used, and the
uncertainties associated with the use of different combinations of GCM and
emissions scenario. To assess the latter, we estimated the standard deviation
of the mean estimate of change in LGP for each pixel from the 75th percentile
of the ensemble distribution (14 climate models and three emissions scenarios).
These are mapped as the coefﬁcients of variation in ﬁgure 1b, and represent
the variability of estimates of LGP primarily in relation to the different climate
models (there are only limited differences between the three emissions scenarios
in the ﬁrst half of the current century). This variability among the climate models
is relatively small for large areas of central and eastern SSA (20% or less), higher
(to 40%) for the crop and agro-pastoral lands of West Africa and parts of southern
Africa, and highest (greater than 50%) in arid and semi-arid rangelands in south-
west Africa and the central desert margins in the north, where LGP is short and
highly variable anyway. These results highlight both the reasonable consensus
among the climate models for shifts in conditions in East Africa and the lack of
consensus as to changes in agricultural conditions in some of the higher-rainfall
areas of West Africa in particular.
We also calculated the primary season failure rate and reliable crop growing
days per year; for methods see Jones & Thornton [25]. Results are not shown
here, but season failure rates increase for all of SSA except for central Africa; in
southern Africa they increase to the point where nearly all rain-fed agriculture
below latitude 15◦S is likely to fail one year in two. These trends are in accord
with previous analyses [26], only here the effects are considerably greater.
In the second analysis, we ran crop simulations for conditions in this 5◦C
warmer world, for maize, Phaseolus bean, and an ‘indicator’ pasture species,
Brachiaria decumbens, a cultivated forage grass widely used for feeding to cattle
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Table 1. Simulated yields (the pixel-weighted averages of 30 independent replications) in four
regions of sub-Saharan Africa, for three crops grown on cropland and pastureland as deﬁned
by Ramankutty et al. [29], under current conditions and in the 2090s. Regions are deﬁned as
follows: Central: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, DR of Congo, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon. East: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda. Southern: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. West: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Togo.
2000s 2090s +5◦C mean % change in CV of change in
yield (kg ha−1) yield (kg ha−1)a productiona production %b
maize
central 744 612 −13 23
east 954 689 −19 7
southern 748 612 −16 22
west 764 536 −23 23
mean 806 612 −24 19
beans
central 666 175 −69 58
east 685 263 −47 6
southern 716 220 −68 48
west 487 63 −87 47
mean 639 182 −71 34
B. decumbens
central 1493 1311 −4 3
east 1745 1570 +9 7
southern 1384 1344 +11 18
west 1498 1437 −6 27
mean 1525 1422 −7 15
aSimulated from the ensemble mean climate of all applicable GCMs and the three AR4 SRES
scenarios.
bCoefﬁcient of variation (100s/m) estimated from the simulated yields using the 75th percentile
of the ensemble climate distribution for all GCMs and scenarios.
in the tropics and subtropics. Runs were done using the models in the decision
support system for agrotechnology transfer (DSSAT; [27]) using similar methods
as those described in Thornton et al. [28]. We ran 30-year replicated simulations
for all pixels classiﬁed as cropland and pastureland in the dataset of Ramankutty
et al. [29]. Average yields for the three crops are shown in table 1 on a regional
basis for current conditions and for the 2090s with a 5◦C temperature increase.
These results show clearly that the increases in LGP projected for parts of
East Africa will not translate into increased agricultural productivity; maize
production is projected to decline by 19 per cent and bean production by 47 per
cent, all other things (such as area sown) being equal, with little or no change for
the pasture grass. These simulated changes take only limited account of shifts in
weather variability; a substantial portion of this region that is currently cropped
already experiences season failure rates of 25 per cent or more, and these areas
will increase in size substantially in the future. Table 1 includes an estimate of the
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coefﬁcient of variation in the change in production for these three crops, again
calculated from the 75th percentile of the ensemble climate distribution for all
climate models and scenarios. In general, this variability is high, indicating that
yield changes are heavily dependent on choice of climate model and emissions
scenario used, except for yield changes in East Africa (and pasture yields in
central Africa), which appear to be remarkably robust.
(b)Other impacts affecting food production
Other studies indicate some of the additional impacts that may be experienced
in a warmer world, which will increase challenges for food production and
food security. Regarding water resources, by 2025 it is projected that 64 per
cent of the world’s population will live in water-stressed basins, compared with
38 per cent today [30]. Large increases in non-irrigation water demands will
occur over the next 50 years, these increases being concentrated in developing
countries. In a 4◦C+ world, 15 per cent of the world’s population (more than
1 billion people) may be exposed to increased water resources stress by 2080,
and 50 per cent of ﬂood-prone people may be exposed to increased ﬂood
hazard [31]. There are also likely to be substantial changes in land suitability
for agriculture in a 4◦C+ world: by the end of the century, 15 per cent of the
land globally that is currently suitable for cultivation would become unsuitable,
although this is more than balanced by an extra 20 per cent of land that is
currently too cold to support cultivation becoming suitable [31]. But there is
no balance in the situation for Africa: in East and southern Africa, Arnell [31]
estimates that about 35 per cent of current cropland will become unsuitable for
cultivation. These stresses will add to the difﬁculties of adopting new varieties
or increasing agricultural productivity, as water and land availability are key
limiting factors.
Over the long term, future disease trends are likely to be heavily modiﬁed
by climate change, although there are no a priori reasons for expecting
that disease risks will automatically increase in general, given that multiple
interacting factors determine infection risk and exposure [32]. Nevertheless,
climate change will increasingly make major public health risks more difﬁcult
to control, especially in developing countries [33]. Future trends in human,
livestock and crop diseases will be affected by various drivers, including shifts
in the spatial and temporal distribution of some disease vectors, such as ticks
and mosquitoes, caused by changes in climate and climate variability, changes
in human population distributions and age structures, and changes in the
development and application of different technologies for combating infectious
diseases. There is considerable heterogeneity in the disease issues associated
with different regions, and the future outlook is complicated [34]. Hunger and
conﬂict may be widespread in a 4◦C+ world, and it is these processes and their
consequences, rather than more direct impacts of climate change and changes in
climate variability, that may become the dominant inﬂuences on health in the
future [33].
Increasing frequency and severity of droughts and extreme weather events,
sea-level rise and other impacts that are at least partially attributable to climate
change, such as shifts in disease risks and the narrowing of livelihood options,
are likely to bring about large-scale population movements during the current
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century. Many of the vulnerable regions are densely populated. It is not easy to
disentangle the environmental drivers of migration from other drivers and thus
to set apart ‘climate migrants’ from other migrants, but enormous migration
pressures are likely to result in a 4◦C+ world [35]. Wide-ranging policies would
be needed to adapt to these greater migratory pressures, and in many cases,
migration would need to be encouraged, not avoided, and the most vulnerable
enabled to move [35].
3. Adaptation to maintain options for agricultural growth and food security
The impacts described above of a 4◦C+ warming in SSA will require quite
radical shifts in agriculture systems, rural livelihood strategies and food security
strategies and policies. In this section, we discuss some of the potential for
and constraints to adaptation in relation to crop varieties and species, livestock
breeds, cropping patterns, changes in rural livelihood strategies and changes
in food security interventions and policy. Our intent is a realistic evaluation
of the steps needed for proactive adaptation to the additional stresses that
climate change will bring to food systems in SSA. We acknowledge the many
successes that local farmers have had in adapting to change [36–38] in modern
times in spite of policies and economic trends that are not in their favour.
We caution, however, that they also pay a price at times, as their capacity
to manage multiple stresses is limited, and often economic pressures outweigh
climatic stresses [39–41]. This is in many cases because of the lack of political
and institutional power that vulnerable communities have throughout SSA. We
also recognize the success stories in agricultural development, such as those
highlighted in the recent book Millions fed [11], which demonstrates what can
occur when institutional support is sufﬁcient for innovation by farmers and
researchers to succeed. However, proactive adaptation to a 4◦C+ world will
require much more concerted effort at all levels to manage quite radical shifts. In
addition, when food security is considered as the outcome of food systems, which
expand beyond agricultural production to include markets, trade and distribution
networks, for example, the evaluation of successful adaptation becomes more
difﬁcult. Food security has not decreased much in SSA in the recent past,
and over the last 3 years price shocks have combined with economic recession
to increase the numbers of food-insecure [42]. The idea that there may well
be limits to adaptation, beyond which action will not reduce vulnerability (or
may even increase it for some), and/or that the necessary actions are not able
to be implemented because of political or other constraints, becomes real in
the case of agriculture and food security in SSA [43,44]. We return to this
notion below.
For crops, changes in management practices and strengthening of seed systems
are two key approaches to adapting agricultural systems in SSA [14]. While
local seed systems can be resilient to climatic stresses [45], the challenge for
the future is to improve access to the varieties that will be needed as climate
changes and to adapt farming systems to new climatic, land and water constraints.
As emphasized by experts on local adaptation, these new practices must build
upon strategies and farming practices that local communities and farmers already
use [39,40,46,47]. For livestock, there are several approaches, including movement
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of feed resources and/or of livestock over what may be large distances, where
this is feasible, as mobility has been demonstrated as the key strategy that
pastoralists rely on to maintain their herds during periods of drought [38]. A
new approach is livestock insurance schemes that are weather-indexed, so that
policy holders are paid in response to ‘trigger events’ such as abnormal rainfall
or high local animal mortality rates. Index-based livestock insurance schemes
based on satellite imagery are currently being piloted in several areas of drought-
prone northern Kenya via novel public–private partnerships [48]. However, these
schemes are themselves highly vulnerable to climate change, as increases in the
frequency and severity of droughts could make them unviable. An approach that
has been used by pastoralists in the past to deal with the vagaries of climate is
to change the mix of livestock species and/or breeds, sometimes on a temporary
basis [49,50], and indeed recent anecdotal information suggests that in parts of
East Africa herders are switching from cattle and sheep to camels and goats. As
for certain crops, some livestock species and breeds are better able to deal with
dry and drought conditions than others, and there may be considerable potential
in some areas for pastoralists and agropastoralists to adapt to a changing climate
in this way.
(a) Constraints to local adaptation
Good practice in adaptation is constrained by a number of factors, and these
will become much more critical in a 4◦C+ world. First, there are inherent limits
to the predictability of both climate and its impacts; and there is variability
in the methods and assumptions used by any single study to assess probable
impacts. Thus, not only is our knowledge of the future necessarily imprecise,
but also the degree of precision claimed by different studies varies considerably,
making such studies not directly comparable. Challinor et al. [14] discuss this
in more detail, citing an example where the simulated responses of maize in
Africa to a doubling of carbon dioxide can be as narrow as −14 to −12 per
cent, or as broad as −98 to +16 per cent. Thus adaptation occurs in the context
of uncertainty, and if that uncertainty is too great then it may be difﬁcult to
assess appropriate adaptation options. Uncertainty about the future can never be
banished entirely, of course, and adaptation decisions will be taken in any case,
but uncertainty may substantially raise the costs of being able to accommodate
fully possible future events with different characteristics [51]. Experience with
use of seasonal forecasts to make short-term crop choices or provide insurance
to households and farmers suggests that uncertainty about even three months
ahead can be difﬁcult for decision makers to incorporate [52], although continued
research on this is a promising way forward. Such research highlights the limits
to scientiﬁc advances alone in fostering adaptation; any new technologies or
information advances are only successful to the extent that they meet farmers’
needs and contexts.
Second, adopting new varieties or different crop and livestock management
techniques requires farmers to take on new risks and explore new markets,
and also requires access to credit and technical support. The ability of many
smallholder farmers in SSA to obtain access to such support mechanisms is
already low [53,54]; the need to adapt to climate change may provide a stimulus to
increase such support, but it can be achieved only with considerable institutional
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and political commitments [55,56]. Currently many farmers rely on a host of
off-farm diversiﬁcation strategies to support their own agricultural activities and
ensure a household income [57]. If a changing climate increases the risks associated
with agriculture, it is not clear how farmers will adjust the balance of on- and off-
farm activities. As a 4◦C+ warming will affect not only what can be grown but
also where, as land suitability shifts, existing successful technological packages
and systems may not be that useful. By 2050, temperature increases may result
in about a quarter of African countries experiencing climatic conditions over
substantial parts of their existing cropped areas for which there are no current
analogues [58]. In places where no historical analogues exist, then pressures on
farming systems, livelihoods, agricultural technology and supporting mechanisms
may become intense, as smallholders become increasingly alienated from their
realm of experience. In this case, the notable trend of economic diversiﬁcation into
non-farm activities would most probably increase even more, as rural residents
made the logical choice to seek less climate-sensitive activities [59], although these
choices may not lead to greater food security [60].
Many authors have argued for vulnerability-led approaches to adaptation,
so as to contextualize how climate change affects livelihoods, and to explain
that successful adaptation depends upon not only exposure and sensitivity to
climate change, but also adaptive capacity and an enabling institutional and
policy environment [61–63]. Emphasizing vulnerability as a social and political
phenomenon also cautions against an over-reliance on research-led solutions
alone. Although many studies in developing country contexts emphasize the
importance of supporting local-level, grassroots adaptation, lessons from decades
of agricultural development interventions have shown the need for higher-level
institutional and policy support as well [59,64,65]; thus local adaptive capacity
requires higher-level enabling support. For example, the recent collections
of success stories in agricultural development and food security achievement
compiled by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are explicit in describing the necessary
enabling conditions, such as access to markets for new crops, national policy that
prioritizes food security, agricultural extension and so on [11]. In a 4◦C+ world,
successful adaptation will require a huge investment in policy and technology.
The constraints described above can combine to produce particularly
pronounced problems when it comes to any particular adaptation option. For
example, the number of crop varieties cultivated by farmers has declined over
time because of an increasing focus on high-yielding varieties, necessitated by
the need for increased production and enabled by the globalization of trade, a
phenomenon referred to as ‘genetic erosion’ (e.g. [66]). A changing climate will
further constrain the number of varieties that can be used, since many may not
be suited to the new environment. Thus, the options for adaptation through a
change in cultivar diminish over time.
Increasing yields is, of course, not the only adaptation option. Expansion
of cropped land can also be used to maintain production. However, climate
change may heavily modify land suitability. In relatively large areas of SSA that
are currently classiﬁed as mixed rain-fed arid–semiarid systems, cropping may
become increasingly risky and marginal, perhaps leading to increased dependence
on livestock keeping or increasing diversiﬁcation into non-agricultural activities
and migration to urban areas. Such areas may, to all intents and purposes,
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‘ﬂip’ from a mixed system to a predominantly rangeland-based system: some
730 000 km2 of SSA may be at risk of such ﬂipping [25], of which about 16
per cent is located in areas within 3 h travel time of a population centre with
more than 250 000 people (a proxy for ‘good accessibility to markets’). We
recalculated the size of the transition areas that may ﬂip from mixed rain-fed
arid–semiarid to rangeland-based arid–semiarid systems using the climate data
outlined in §2a above. In a 5◦C+ world, the transition zone increases in size to
some 1.2million km2 (about 5% of the land area of SSA). Moreover, with such
warming, the proportion of this transition zone that is in areas of high accessibility
increases to about 50 per cent. Such conditions would mean considerable loss of
cropland in SSA (cropping would become too risky in about 35% of the mixed
rain-fed arid–semiarid systems); and increasing amounts of this land would be in
the hinterlands of large urban areas with already high population densities.
Such changes in the agricultural landscape and crop geography will require
signiﬁcant adjustments in livelihood strategies and agricultural growth pathways.
As already discussed, decades of work on agricultural development has shown
that farmers need support to switch strategies, and the evidence suggests that
there are no historical analogues for the growing conditions in a 4◦C+ world in
which globalization has changed the structure of food systems [8,67]. Although
the recent increased investment by the World Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation and other donors in the long-neglected agricultural sector are timely
and welcome, the engagement of these groups with the reality of a changing
climate is only just beginning, as evidenced by the 2010 World Development
Report on ‘Development and Climate Change’ and the launch in 2010 of the
new Challenge Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
(www.ccafs.org).
(b) The adaptive capacity of food systems
As patterns of agricultural production will change profoundly in a 4◦C+ world,
the question of how food security will be affected, and whether food systems
can adapt sufﬁciently to avoid increased food insecurity, raises a host of issues.
Food security depends upon much more than just local agricultural production,
as access to food is often the major reason why poor households suffer from
hunger [42,68]. Access is a function of both income and price of food, as well
as of the ability of markets and distribution networks to allocate food equitably
(from the household to the international level; [69]). In Africa, progressive climate
change will increase the probability of failed agricultural seasons owing not only
to long-term shifts in temperature and precipitation but also to the probably
increased frequency of droughts and ﬂoods [70]. Thus increases in transitory food
insecurity episodes can be expected. The lessons gathered from 30 years of food
security analyses and interventions demonstrate the following:
— Repeated droughts erode the assets of poor and marginal farmers, and
relief interventions struggle to protect such households effectively from
food insecurity and poverty [71,72]. Food aid as a long-term strategy is not
wise [73]; both food- and cash-based transfer or safety net programmes are
difﬁcult to design and implement on a broad scale, particularly in response
to seasonal shocks [74,75].
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— The responses of national governments to protect food security in the face
of supply and price shocks are not always successful, particularly over
the long term [76,77]. The domestic interventions of multiple national
governments are partially blamed for exacerbating the impacts of the
2007–2008 food price increases.
As we saw in 2007–2008, crop failures in major exporting countries such as
Australia, when occurring at the same time as other food system disruptions
such as speculation, increased demand for agricultural commodities and low grain
reserves, can lead to widespread, global food price increases [78]. As climate
change is a global phenomenon, we can expect more price shocks in the future.
The evidence about a country’s ‘adaptive capacity’ in the face of the 2008 price
shocks is sobering, as many reverted to domestic price controls, export bans or
import tariffs, and globally food aid was in short supply. Food insecurity persists
not only because of economic imbalances between rich and poor, but also due to
power imbalances, between governments as well as between communities. This
manifests itself not only in political negotiations such as the Doha Round of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) but also in differential capacity of markets
and national policies to accommodate food price shocks [79–81]. The lesson from
this is that there is still much learning to do concerning how to implement risk
management and agricultural growth strategies for SSA at the necessary scale.
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report [15] assumes that regional shortfalls in
SSA can be ameliorated with imports from global markets; the experience of
2008 underscores the difﬁculties that such an ‘adaptation’ strategy will face
in reality.
(c) Diminishing technical options for adaptation
Constraints to adaptation at the local level (§3a above), together with the
indications above that the adaptive capacity of food systems is also limited, lead
to a reduction in the number of adaptation options as climate moves further from
the current coping range. While, at ﬁrst glance, globalization may appear to offer
a mechanism for smoothing out geographical differences and thus stabilizing food
supply, it is far from clear that this is the case. If options are reduced across the
globe, then we cannot rely on redistribution of resources via trade as an adaptive
mechanism. Simulation results for maize in the USA [82] are one indication
that this may indeed be the case, with existing varieties showing an overall
decreasing crop production under scenarios of climate change. Although there
were some regional variations, the results of that study indicated that adaptation
to climate change for maize yields would require either increased tolerance of
maximum summer temperatures in existing maize varieties or a change in the
maize varieties grown. Similar projections have been made for a range of crops
across the globe. Spring wheat crop failures in China have been projected to
increase with (both local and global) mean temperature, owing to an increasing
occurrence of extremes of heat and drought [83]. This suggests that here too
the options for adaptation are decreasing. Quantifying climate uncertainty is an
important aspect of such assessments: using one regional climate scenario across
India, and quantifying uncertainty in the response of crops to elevated CO2,
Challinor [83] found signiﬁcant potential for adaptation of groundnut cultivation
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to climate change in India. However, a subsequent, fuller account of uncertainty
in climate demonstrated that this potential will not necessarily maintain current
yields [84].
Comprehensive analyses of adaptation options are difﬁcult to make, partly
owing to the complexity of any adaptive system. Even when only one option is
considered, such as a change in crop variety, insufﬁcient data may be available
for analysis. Germplasm databanks provide an invaluable source of information
for matching crops to future climates. Making use of one such dataset—the
multi-location International Wheat Information System held at the International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center CIMMYT—we examined the response
of 2711 varieties of spring wheat to increases in mean temperature. We used
observed current crop durations with proscribed changes in mean temperature
in order to calculate future crop durations. We chose the northern USA as
the study region, since the current mean growing season temperature in this
region is around 21◦C, thus permitting the assumption that the optimum
temperature for development is greater than any season-mean temperature
and allowing us to use the methods of Challinor et al. [84, eqn (3)] to
calculate duration. At +2◦C of local warming, 87 per cent of the 2711 varieties
examined, and all of the top ﬁve most common varieties, could be used to
result in a crop duration similar to that of the current climate. This can be
interpreted as a successful adaptation to mean warming. At +4◦C, however,
the proportion fell to 54 per cent of all varieties, and only two of the
top ﬁve.
While the above analysis is relatively simple, assessing only crop response
to mean temperature, it does illustrate the way in which adaptation options
diminish as climate changes. Furthermore, we have seen that diminishing options
in one region of the globe result in diminishing options elsewhere. Thus, the
options available for adaptation to climate change for SSA, whether domestic
or foreign, are likely to decrease. What is unclear is at what point those options
become too few for successful adaptation across a region. This is a major question,
given the many problems that continue to plague African food systems. It may
be that critical thresholds are already being reached because of economic and
policy failures. While understanding of physical thresholds in the Earth system
is increasing [85], as yet we have little understanding of socio-economic and
cultural thresholds. Understanding and quantifying the critical thresholds in
global food systems and how these play out in SSA in particular is an urgent
research issue.
4. Conclusions
The prognosis for agriculture and food security in SSA in a 4◦C+ world is
bleak. Already today, the number of people at risk from hunger has never
been higher: it increased from 300 million in 1990 to 700 million in 2007,
and it is estimated that it may exceed 1 billion in 2010 [42]. The cost of
achieving the food security Millennium Development Goal in a +2◦C world is
around $40–60 billion per year, and without this investment, serious damage
from climate change will not be avoided [86]. Currently, the prospects for
such levels of sustained investment are not that bright. Croppers and livestock
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keepers in SSA have in the past shown themselves to be highly adaptable to
short- and long-term variations in climate [14], but the kind of changes that
would occur in a 4◦C+ world would be way beyond anything experienced in
recent times. There are many options that could be effective in helping farmers
adapt even to medium levels of warming, given substantial investments in
technologies, institution building and infrastructural development, for example,
but it is not difﬁcult to envisage a situation where the adaptive capacity and
resilience of hundreds of millions of people in SSA could simply be overwhelmed
by events.
At the moment, it seems unlikely that international climate policies will
succeed in conﬁning global warming to +2◦C; even this will require unprecedented
collective will and collective action [16]. What can realistically be done in
relation to food security in SSA in the short to medium term? We highlight
four things. First, we can assist the adaptation that is already inevitable by
identifying, encouraging and helping to implement proactive adaptation to keep
the number of options high for smallholders. Households’ capacity to adapt
in the face of increasing external stresses is largely governed by ﬂexibility in
livelihood options, and there is increasing evidence that generally it is the
poorer households that can gain the most from implementing options for coping
with and managing risk [87]. A wide variety of prospective options exist, from
the effective use of climate information to paying smallholders for ecosystem
goods and services to increase household income. Some of these options are
likely to be robust, even given the uncertainties that exist concerning future
patterns of climate change. But the lessons of the recent past teach us that
the difﬁculty of implementing many of these options in SSA should not be
underestimated: massive investment and increases in agricultural productivity
will be necessary if economic development is to succeed in Africa in the coming
decades [88].
Second, we need to go ‘back to basics’ in collecting data and information.
Difﬁcult though it may be for many people to accept in the second decade of the
twenty-ﬁrst century, the fact is that land-based observation and data collection
systems in SSA have been in decline for decades. This affects the most basic
data: weather data, land-use data, and crop and livestock distribution data, for
example. For instance, estimates of the cropland extent in Africa range from about
1 to more than 6million km2, the value depending on choice of satellite-derived
product [89]. The uncertainty in such basic information (‘where are crops grown
and how much of them is there?’) adds considerable difﬁculty to the quantiﬁcation
and evaluation of impacts and adaptation options. There is much technology that
is being brought to bear on data issues: remote sensing of weather information,
validation of different land-use products using Wikis and Google Earth (see
www.geo-wiki.org) and dissemination of market information using mobile phone
technology in East Africa, to name just a few. But many of these things need to
complement land-based observations, not substitute for them. A similar situation
exists with respect to germplasm data. Speciﬁc information on the response of
crops to weather and climate is often not collected, but it could be with relatively
modest additional effort.
Third, concerted action is needed to maintain and exploit global stocks of crop
germplasm and livestock genes. Preservation of genetic resources will have a key
role to play in helping croppers and livestock keepers adapt to climate change
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and the shifts in disease prevalence and severity that may occur as a result.
Genetic diversity is already being seriously affected by global change. Genetic
erosion of crops has been mostly associated with the introduction of modern
cultivars, and its continuing threat may be highest for crops for which there are
currently no breeding programmes [90]. Breeding efforts for such crops could thus
be critically important. For livestock, about 16 per cent of the nearly 4000 breeds
recorded in the twentieth century had become extinct by 2000, and a ﬁfth of
reported breeds are now classiﬁed as at risk [91]. Using germplasm in SSA will
need technical, economic and policy support. Revitalizing agricultural extension
services, whether private or in the public sector, is key: no farmers will grow
crops or raise livestock they do not know, are not able to sell, and are not used
to eating.
Fourth, the social, economic and political processes that contribute to
vulnerability and food insecurity must be addressed with even greater vigour.
Food insecurity has received renewed policy attention since 2008, when several
high-level meetings on food security were held in response to the food price crisis.
Political reforms have been proposed, and countries have made commitments
to better food system governance and increased investment in smallholder
agriculture. In addition, the momentum for supporting community-based and
local adaptation is building in communities of practice; however, this requires
higher-level policy and institutional support to ensure that local-level adaptation
is enabled and communities are empowered.
The agricultural landscape of SSA is likely to undergo considerable change in
the coming decades as a result of several different drivers. Food systems will have
to adapt to ensure food security for the extra billion people who will be populating
the African continent by 2050, and this will require broad and integrated (yet
locally context-speciﬁc) institutional and policy responses. It would not be wise
to bank on limiting climate change to +2◦C, and we should be prepared for
more. Some places may see sustainable intensiﬁcation of production, where this
is possible, others may see shifts in crop and livestock production, and some of
the drylands are likely to need sustainable extensiﬁcation as cropping becomes
ever riskier. Keeping smallholders’ options open is key, and a substantial part
of this will lie in much better understanding of the limits to adaptation and the
thresholds beyond which much more radical action will be needed, if food security
is to be achieved in SSA.
We are very grateful to Mark New and Gil Lizcano for making climate model data available to us,
and to two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on an earlier draft. Remaining errors
and omissions are our own responsibility.
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